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Introduction 
 
The problem of suboptimal local government size stems from historical circumstance (the 
evolution of local government structure) and the current nature of vertical inter-
governmental relations.  Small size itself does not have to be a problem if the inter-
governmental structure accounts for differences in scale and capacity.   Many European 
countries and the US face a local government sector dominated by many small 
municipalities.  In the US, there are over 39,000 units of multi-purpose local government 
(Census of Governments, 2007).   
 
The challenge of suboptimal local government size raises two concerns: 1) capacity - small 
size can lead to inadequate financial or managerial capacity, and 2) fragmentation can 
undermine efficiency (due to lack of economies of scale) and prevent coordination necessary 
for regional economic competitiveness and environmental management.  It is these two 
concerns, capacity and fragmentation, and their implications for rural government viability 
on the one hand and metropolitan regional coordination on the other hand, that drive 
scholarly and practical policy interest in the question of suboptimal government size. 
 
The problem of fragmented and suboptimal sized local government is not just a challenge 
stemming from external forces and structures (Swanstrom, 2006), it is also an issue for 
internal forces as Imbroscio (2006) argues in his critique of scholars who attempt to “shame 
the inside game.”  To address the challenges of suboptimal government size we need 
attention to both the inside and the outside game. 
 Does Local Government Size Matter?  Privatization and Hybrid Systems of Local Service Delivery 3 
On the outside – we need attention to the vertical structure of inter-governmental authority 
and finance.  On the inside – we need attention to capacity and political will.  First I will 
address the context of vertical inter-governmental relations that can ameliorate or exacerbate 
problems of suboptimal local government size. Then I will turn to my attention to the inside 
game – what a local government can do on its own to address the challenge.  In this second 
arena I will give special attention to the possibilities of using privatization or hybrid market 
forms of service delivery to address the challenges of suboptimal local government size. In 
this review I will focus primarily on the US local government experience and answer the 
question, “Can privatization and hybrid forms of service delivery help address the problem 
of suboptimal government size?”  I will explore what we know from the empirical evidence 
on privatization by government size, what explains differences in level of privatization by 
size, and how these problems can be addressed by market management strategies.  
Suboptimal government size can occur at both ends of the spectrum – too small to realize 
scale economies and too large to enjoy market competition.  The solutions require more 
effective market management: 1) creating more competition by splitting the market, the 
service or the management, and 2) promoting coordination by combining markets, 
management and services.  The paper begins by addressing the overarching context of the 
vertical inter-governmental structure of finance and service responsibility that sets the 
context for a concern over suboptimal government size.  Concerns with equity, regional 
coordination and sustainability drive much of the government size debate, but this paper will 
show these concerns are not effectively addressed by market management strategies.  
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Outside Strategies: External Context and Inter-Governmental Structure 
The public choice and anti-consolidationist literature argues there are serious advantages to 
small, fragmented local government (Parks and Oakerson, 1993; Bish, 2001).  Politically 
they afford the opportunity for local difference, diversity and democratic choice.  Local 
governments are considered “laboratories of democracy,” the place where political skills are 
developed and new service delivery innovations are found.  Political fragmentation allows 
for diversity in service delivery – both in quantity and style of public services.  This can lead 
to governmental innovation (Osborne and Plastrick, 1997).  It can also lead to inequity. 
 
The Fiscal Federalists support fragmentation because it promotes fiscal equivalence – 
balancing service delivery with local government revenue (Oates, 1998).  This forces fiscal 
discipline on local governments and ensures residents get what they pay for and pay for the 
services they want to receive.  The problem of requesting more services and hoping to free 
ride on their delivery is reduced under such a local government system. Curiously the term 
‘territorial equivalence’ is used in the Nordic countries to mean just the opposite – to make 
equivalent the prospects for local government service even in remote, poor rural areas 
(Bryden and Warner, 2012).  Although the US recognizes that poor governments constrain 
the development prospects of their residents and this poverty of government services 
exacerbates territorial inequality (Warner and Pratt, 2005; Johnson, et al., 1995; Stinson, 
1968), there is little political will to address the inequity.  In the EU by contrast, concern 
over social inclusion is one of the drivers behind regional and rural development policy 
(Shortall and Warner, 2011; Powell, Boyne and Ashworth, 2001; Stewart, 2003). Research 
across the EU, Asia and North America has shown generally that decentralization does not 
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lead to improved economic growth (Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004; Nelson and Foster, 
1999).  Concerns with regional inequality and redistributional equity are important, not just 
for equity reasons, but also for economic growth. 
 
Australia and New Zealand embarked on major consolidation efforts over the last decade – 
to mixed effect.  While they gained the ability to plan and coordinate service delivery on a 
larger scale (to address environmental concerns like watersheds, and urban concerns like 
transportation management), they faced a governance challenge of rebuilding citizen identity 
and participation in the new, larger units of local government.  Recent research has shown 
that these larger units are not cheaper (Byrnes and Dollery 2002; Dollery and Johnson, 
2005), but they are more professional and may be providing services that better coordinate 
across a larger scale and as such may help position localities to compete more effectively in 
a global world (Holzer and Fry, 2011; Aulich et al., 2011).  During a 2010 national local 
government conference in Australia, officers from New South Wales and Victoria – two 
states that conducted major amalgamations in the last decade – indicated that no one wanted 
to go back to the earlier system. Consolidation has enhanced strategic capacity but still 
leaves revenue and service delivery challenges (Aulich, et al. 2011, McKinlay 2011a).  
 
In the US, and in much of Europe, consolidation of local government has not been a major 
policy thrust.  In the US political support for localism is very high (Briffault, 2000).  As in 
Australia, local governments are controlled by the states, so there is much diversity in local 
government authority and structure across the fifty states (Frug and Barron, 2009).  
However, local governments in the US have more service responsibility (police, social 
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welfare, education) than in Australia and most of Europe.  In the US there have been few 
voluntary amalgamations despite much academic research touting the benefits (Orfield, 
1997, 2002; Rusk, 1993, 1999).  Instead, attention has shifted to functional consolidation in 
specific service areas.  This functional consolidation is both top down and bottom up.  The 
primary example of top down consolidation is found in the Metropolitan Planning 
Organizations required by the Federal government in order to help manage federal 
transportation funds (Downs, 1994).  The bottom up forms are based on voluntary 
cooperation either as service specific inter-governmental contracting (which in the US is as 
common as for profit contracting), or in regional councils of government (Warner, 2011b).  
However, these service specific forms of coordination are critiqued for being limited in 
focus, professional in organization, and undemocratic (Frug, 1999).  A body of academic 
research is assessing whether these functional consolidation approaches can achieve the 
equity and multi-functional coordination that is really needed (Bollens, 1997; Lowe, 2011; 
Pastor et al., 2009).  Regional councils of government may offer more promise as they are 
both multi-functional and composed of elected officials, not just technocrats (Korsching et 
al., 1992).   
 
Voluntary approaches are celebrated in the US both theoretically and practically.  Public 
Choice theory is founded on the notion that a competitive market of local government is 
both efficient and democratic. Charles Tiebout’s famous 1956 article celebrates the 
possibility of efficiency achieved through a competitive, fragmented local government 
structure.  The rise of suburban local governments in the US in the 1950s gave credence to 
the power of a fragmented local government system based on mobility and choice.  
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However, reviews of the evidence point to problems with information asymmetry, resource 
inequality and lack of mobility – especially for the poor (Lowery, 2000).  Community 
choice is driven by more than preference for a specific tax and service combination.  Race 
continues to be a major signaling mechanism (Trout, 2000; Lichter, et al., 2007; Marsh, et 
al., 2010).  Resource and service inequality in a fragmented local government system 
undermines regional equity across the metropolitan region (Frug, 1999; Frug and Barron, 
2008; Pastor et al., 2009; Marsh, et al., 2010).  For rural areas, fragmentation and sub-
optimal government size leads to problems of “government poverty” and reduced 
opportunities for residents (Stinson, 1968; Reeder and Jansen, 1995; Warner, 2001; Warner 
and Pratt, 2005; Dewees, Lobao and Swanson, 2003).  Katz (2001) describes this system of 
differing levels of public services based on residential location as the “price of citizenship” 
in a fragmented, decentralized system. Although planners promote consolidation as a 
preferred option (Rusk, 1993; 1999; Orfield, 1997; 2002), support for consolidation in the 
US remains limited and weak.  It is now recognized that attention must be focused on the 
political structure and preferences in order to achieve support for regional integration (Pastor 
et al., 2009).   
 
 
It is possible to promote administrative decentralization to achieve the objectives of 
democracy and localized input while maintaining fiscal centralization to ensure more equity 
in the delivery of public goods (Prud homme, 1995).  Both neoclassical and Marxists 
scholars agree that local government will be focused primarily on developmental services 
over redistributional ones (Schneider, 1989; Peterson, 1981; O’Connor, 1973).  And yet 
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redistributive services are the more important ones to ensure individual mobility and social 
inclusion.   In the US, even education and health expenditures are financed heavily at the 
local government level.  This is part of what makes local government fragmentation such a 
serious problem for equity and socio economic mobility in the United States. 
 
Inter-governmental aid or centralization of fiscal responsibility can address inequality in 
resources and reduce the capacity problems of small local governments.   Administrative 
decentralization may be optimal – for the service diversity and innovation noted above, 
while fiscal decentralization may be undesirable due to inequality of resources across the 
local government landscape.  It is possible to have administrative decentralization without 
fiscal decentralization.  Thus one structural solution to the problem of suboptimal local 
government size is greater intergovernmental aid or centralization of fiscal responsibility to 
higher levels of government.  Models of spatial inequality among local governments in the 
US have found centralization of fiscal responsibility upward to the state is more important 
than state aid in relieving inequality of effort across local governments (Warner, 2001; 
Warner and Pratt, 2005).  In the public education sector, a series of fiscal equalization suits 
are making their way through the state courts now and forcing a redesign of the educational 
finance system toward more state centralization of fiscal responsibility (Baicker and 
Gordon, 2006).  Analysis of the results of such fiscal equalization in education expenditure 
in California, where the experience is the longest, shows greater equality in finance but a 
leveling down of the public finance of education on a per pupil basis (Silva and Sonstelie, 
1995).  Peterson (1981) argues, and the empirical research shows, that the upper income tax 
payer, who can’t capture the benefits of extra tax for his own children, is less likely to 
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support overall tax increases for all.  Maintaining broad political support is the challenge of 
centralization/redistribution schemes, especially in societies like the US where notions of 
social inclusion have little policy salience.   
 
Although fiscal equivalence is a primary justification for local government fragmentation in 
the US, states often place limits on the level of local choice regarding taxation and service 
levels.  More than half the states have implemented tax or expenditure limitations, TELs, on 
local governments.  TELs are typically proposed in an effort to keep taxes down and limit 
the size of government budgets.  Their effectiveness in this regard remains unproven 
(IUCUPE, 1995; Resnick, 2004). Local governments get around the limits by promoting 
special districts which have their own taxing authority outside the government limit. They 
also increase reliance on user fees.  The general conclusion on TELS is that they do not 
result in lower expenditures but do result in lower accountability and more fragmentation 
(due to the proliferation of special districts) –exacerbating the problem of sup-optimal 
government size in terms of both scale and scope economies. 
 
The US has some of the most fiscally autonomous local governments in the world.  Locally 
raised revenue accounts for about 57% of local government budgets, state aid for close to 
40%, and Federal aid for less than 3% (US Census of Government 2002).  In addition 
education expenditures are primarily a local government responsibility in the US, in stark 
contrast to most other OECD nations where education is a national responsibility. 
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Thus it is clear that the structure of inter-governmental fiscal and service responsibilities 
matters to the question of suboptimal local government size.  The more competencies and 
the lower the level of redistributive aid or fiscal centralization of expenditure responsibility, 
the more important the problem of suboptimal government size becomes.  In the US, 
inequity is an important and persistent result (Brown and Warner, 1991).   
 
Because the quality of local services, especially education, varies so widely across local 
governments, residents consider their local public services as “private” e.g. just for residents 
inside their jurisdictional borders.  These service quality differences reinforce political 
boundaries and reduce political support for regional coordination (Frug, 1999).  These 
boundary differences help explain the emergence of independent cities (seceding from their 
counties in Virginia), or new city formation as rich suburbs incorporate to avoid sharing 
resources with the larger municipality of which they were formally a part.  Far from the 
elastic city that expands to encompass its suburbs that David Rusk (1999) calls for, we 
instead see the fragmentation of the metro region to ensure continued inequality in service 
delivery.  Some of these new cities have emerged as contract cities – trying to avoid creating 
a government apparatus and relying heavily on contracting to provide their service needs 
(McKinlay 2011a).   
 
The emergence of private interest governments at the neighborhood level reflects a further 
fragmentation.  Most new residential development is in these private interest developments 
in the US and in much of Europe and the developing world (Nelson, 2005; Glasze, et al., 
2006).  While these club approaches to service delivery are efficient within the club 
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(Webster and Lai, 2003), they have problems with long term sustainability and coordination 
across the city and metropolitan region (Warner, 2011a).   
 
Now I will shift my attention from the ‘outside’ - the structure of local government 
organization and finance - and in the rest of this chapter I will look at the ‘inside’ - 
specifically the role contracting can play in helping municipalities address the problem of 
suboptimal size.  However, we need to be cognizant of the broader political and economic 
context in which contracting, as a strategy should be understood. 
 
Inside Strategies: Contracting and Hybrid Market Approaches 
 Contracting is a primary mechanism local governments can use to address suboptimal 
government size.  If their jurisdiction lacks sufficient size to enjoy economies of scale, they 
can join with other neighboring governments or contract with private providers to deliver 
services.  Contracts to private providers or to other local governments can help 
municipalities realize scale economies without consolidation.  Early studies by the anti-
consolidationists pointed to the popularity and efficiency of inter-governmental contracting 
as the reason why consolidation was unnecessary (Parks and Oakerson, 1993; Bish and 
Ostrom, 1973). Back office services, such as police dispatch, are especially strong 
candidates for inter-governmental contracting (they enjoy economies of scale), and this 
leaves “high touch” services with close contact with residents, such as police patrols, local.  
Local identity can be as important a factor in service delivery as concerns with efficiency 
(Warner and Hebdon, 2001) and this is especially important for services which have high 
resident contact.   
12 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
In the US, the International City County Management Association has tracked the levels of 
use of alternative service delivery among local governments.  What we find is that inter-
governmental contracting and private for profit contracting are the two most common 
alternatives to direct public provision.  Under for profit contracting local governments often 
face problems maintaining competition and adequate information for benchmaking, thus one 
hybrid innovation that US local governments pursue is to mix public delivery and 
contracting for the same service.  Analysis of this mixed market delivery shows that it is 
driven by concerns with cost savings and lack of competition, is more likely to be practiced 
by local governments with professional managers, and reflects a growing concern over 
citizen satisfaction with service (Warner and Hefetz, 2008).  Local government managers 
attempt to balance multiple objectives - efficiency, service quality and market management.  
Mixed market strategies give local government managers more involvement and control in 
their public service markets.  
 
This paper is primarily concerned with differences in the use of these major alternatives by 
government size.  Figure 1 shows the use of direct public delivery and the major alternatives 
– for profit contracting, inter-governmental cooperation and mixed public/contracting by 
population using US local government data recently released by ICMA for 2007.  
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Figure 1 Service Delivery Trends by Population Size, US Municipalities, 2007 
 
Percents do not some to 100 because mixed delivery involves multiple categories and non-
profit delivery is not included.   
 
International City County Management Association Alternative Service Delivery Survey 
data 2007: Author Analysis. N=1474. Population categories: 2,500 – 5,000 = 136, 5,001 – 
10,000 = 139, 10,001 – 50,000 =811, 50,001 – 150,000 = 260, greater than 150,001 = 128; 
US Census of Population, 2000. 
 
What Figure 1 shows clearly is that direct public delivery is more prevalent at the two ends 
of the population spectrum.  Governments with small population and those with large 
population have higher levels of direct public provision (a sort of U shaped curve).  For 
profit privatization has the opposite pattern – an inverted U with the highest rates among the 
mid-sized governments (10,000-50,000 population).   Inter-governmental cooperation is 
more common among the smaller governments and drops as population size increases.  
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Mixed delivery rises steadily with population size as it requires a large enough scale to split 
the market into public and contracted components. 
 
These results reflect a general pattern found in the literature on privatization and alternative 
service delivery in the US (Warner 2006a, 2009; Joassart-Marcelli and Musso, 2005; 
Warner and Hefetz, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Nelson, 1997; Hirsch, 1995; Ferris and Graddy, 
1994; Kodrzyski, 1994).  Smaller communities face less competitive markets of alternative 
private suppliers and thus rely more heavily on contracting with neighboring governments or 
direct public provision.   Mid-sized communities have higher rates of both privatization and 
cooperation because they exist in a market of other mid-sized communities which creates 
more opportunities for both privatization and cooperation.  Large communities have lower 
use of both alternatives because they already enjoy internal economies of scale and the 
market of similar sized communities is smaller.  Similar results have been found in Spain 
and the Netherlands (Bel and Mur, 2009; Bel and Fageda, 2006, 2010; Bel et al., 2010).   
 
The issue is not just one of population size; it also reflects geographical location.  Figure 2 
presents the US data by metro status – rural, suburban and urban.  We see a similar pattern 
to Figure 1 above. Public delivery is U shaped with highest reliance on public delivery in 
rural and metro core places.  For profit delivery is an inverted U – highest in suburbs.  
Cooperation is similar for rural and suburban municipalities but lower among metro core 
places.  Mixed delivery is lowest for rural places and higher for suburb and metro core 
municipalities.   
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Figure 2 Service Delivery Trends by Metro Status, US Municipalities, 2007 
 
Percents do not some to 100 because mixed delivery involves multiple categories and non-
profit delivery is not included.   
 
International City County Management Association Alternative Service Delivery Survey 
data 2007: Author Analysis. N=1474, Metro=262, Suburb=784, Rural=428. 
 
What explains these differences across size and metropolitan status?  The answers lie in cost 
of service delivery, nature of market and capacity of local government.  The population and 
metro status figures reinforce a similar message. Rural and small municipalities are less 
likely to use privatization and more likely to use cooperation or direct public delivery.  
Research has shown that small rural communities have higher costs of service delivery – the 
costs of sparsity (Reeder and Jansen, 1995; Warner, 2001).  They also face more limited 
markets of alternative private suppliers.  Despite a competitive market ethos in the US, real 
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levels of competition are low in most public service markets.  This causes local government 
managers to spend inordinate amounts of time chasing and nurturing competition (Johnston 
and Girth, forthcoming).  This market management activity comes at the expense of time 
spent on monitoring and accountability.   
 
Inadequate competition is a problem across the size spectrum but especially serious for 
small rural governments.  In a national survey of levels of competition in local markets for 
local public services, Warner and Hefetz (2010) found rural municipalities faced on average 
only 1.1 alternative suppliers for each service as compared to 1.8 for suburban and metro 
core places.  Lack of competition in the private market leads rural communities to rely more 
heavily on a public market of inter-governmental cooperation.   Metro core municipalities, at 
the other extreme, face the costs of congestion which require a more complex and higher 
level of service delivery.  This limits the number of alternative providers with the capacity to 
meet metro core needs.  The large scale of metro governments also reduces the need to go to 
market as many services have exhausted any economy of scale advantages at much lower 
levels of population.  Medium sized and suburban communities appear to enjoy dual 
advantages here – they engage alternative forms of delivery at higher levels than either end 
of the metro status or population spectrum and they face a more competitive market of 
alternative supplies.   
 
The pictures presented in Figures 1 and 2 are confirmed in statistical analysis. Regression 
analyses of for profit contracting and inter-municipal contracting for the 2002 and 2007 
period (the most recent data available) are given in Table 1 below.  The models show that 
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for profit privatization is more commonly found among local governments that have larger 
populations and are suburban.  Inter-government contracting, by contrast, is more common 
among local governments with smaller populations, and among counties and suburbs – 
places that have the capacity and need to cooperate to gain scale.  While for profit 
contracting is more common among places with higher incomes and lower poverty (more 
attractive markets), cooperation is income neutral and more likely to be found in 
communities with higher poverty – suggesting cooperation has some pro-equity effects.  For 
a complete description of model variables and results (see Hefetz et al. 2012).  
 
A similar dual market structure has been found in Spain where small municipalities face 
competition from smaller, regional firms, and large cities face competition from large 
national and international firms (Bel and Fageda, 2011).  Concentration in public service 
markets for waste collection is also well documented in the Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus, 2007; 2008) and in the UK (Davies, 2007).  Lack of competition in public service 
markets leads to less privatization and more inter-governmental contracting (Brown and 
Potoski, 2003; Levin and Tadelis, 2010; Hefetz and Warner, 2011). Past research has found 
cooperation to have more pro-equity effects than privatization and differences in use of 
market alternatives explained more by market attractiveness (wealth, metropolitan status) 
than by managerial characteristics (Warner and Hefetz, 2002a; 2002b; 2003; Warner, 2006a; 
2009; Hefetz, et al., 2012).  
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Table 1 Regression Results for U.S. Cities and Counties, 2002-2007 
 Inter-Municipal 
Contracting 
 For-Profit 
Contracting 
Parameter 2002 2007  2002  2007 
Ln(Population) -.046* -.064*  .033* .014* 
Suburb Dummy .194* .117*  .111* .138* 
County Dummy .231* .110*  -.027 -.146* 
Total  Local Expenditure Per Capita -.018 .006  -.040* .006 
Ln(Per Capita Income) .048 -.007  .121* .120* 
Percent Poverty .005* .223  -.004* -.091 
Efficiency/Monitoring Index .166* -.082*  .296* .242* 
Voice Index .017 .238*  .213* .025 
Internal Opposition Index .037 .008  .062* -.058* 
External fiscal pressures -.090* -.032  .005 .092* 
State or federal mandates .019 -.003  -.068* -.004 
Change in political climate -.055 -.149*  .045 -.039 
Council Manager Dummy .076* .062*  .061* -.005 
Intercept -1.631* -.417  -2.608* -2.442* 
* Sig. at P<0.05 
Source: Author Analysis drawn from Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot, 2012 
 
So what is the problem of suboptimal government size as regards privatization and 
alternative forms of service delivery?  We see problems on two ends and in the middle.  
Both small rural governments and large metro core governments engage market alternatives 
at a lower rate than their medium sized and suburban counterparts.  The solution then points 
to efforts to enhance size and scale at the lower end by promoting more cooperation among 
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small rural places so they can more effectively contract with each other and with private 
market providers. At the metro core end of the spectrum government may be “too large” and 
we may gain efficiencies by splitting the market or the service so that we can increase 
market attractiveness.  These strategies both involve creating a market – either by 
cooperating to gain scale or by splitting a service or a market to create competition.  But 
there is also a problem in the middle.  Suburban fragmentation does not address the 
problems of service coordination across a metropolitan region. So from a local government 
unit perspective, the suboptimal size problem is primarily a rural, small community problem. 
But from a metropolitan regional perspective, suburban fragmentation impedes a 
coordinated regional view. 
 
Constructing Markets 
The promise of privatization and hybrid strategies is that local governments may be able to 
overcome the disadvantages of sub optimal size through market management.  The analysis 
above has shown how contracting to private providers or other governments and mixed 
strategies are used by local governments at differential rates across size, geographic and 
economic characteristics.  What follows below is a more in depth discussion of how local 
governments can create a market either by combining to gain scale (cooperation) or splitting 
a service or a market to create competition.  Both of these strategies require an explicit local 
government role in creating and managing markets.  A third hybrid strategy is the use of 
mixed public and private approaches at the level of the market or of the firm.  A central 
theme in all of these market-type alternatives is the need for government capacity to manage 
markets and promote coordination. Small and rural municipalities use these market 
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approaches at lower rates as they require scale (to split the market or the service) and 
management capacity (to combine markets or create mixed strategies) which the smallest 
municipalities lack.  Research has shown it is not ideology, but market attractiveness and 
limited managerial capacity that explains the lower use of privatization and mixed strategies 
by small rural governments (Warner and Hefetz 2003, Warner and Hefetz, 2008; Warner 
2006a, 2009, Bel and Mur, 2009; Bel and Fageda, 2006; 2007). 
 
Combining Markets to Gain Scale 
In the US inter-governmental contracting is highest in social welfare services (child welfare, 
welfare eligibility, drug programs, job training) and infrastructure services (transit, airports, 
hazardous waste management).   These are services that require coordination across the 
metropolitan region as labor markets, transit regions and waste disposal (as opposed to 
collection) all operate at a larger geographic scale than just one municipality.  Cooperation 
in social welfare services reflects the need for technical expertise that can be shared across 
several municipalities.  In Spain, Bel and Mur (2009) find small rural communities 
cooperate even in waste collection and in doing so are able to deliver a more frequent 
service at lower cost. Many small Spanish municipalities overcome the problem of small 
size by cooperating to gain scale and then privatizing (Bel, 2006; Bel and Mur, 2009; Bel 
and Fageda, 2006).  This gives them a scale to be seen in the market and to negotiate better 
terms with private operators.  Despite this, Bel and Fageda (2011) still find that small rural 
municipalities mostly have contracts with small firms that operate on a local basis, while 
large firms that operate on a national basis dominate the markets in larger municipalities.  
They find this structure limits competition and the potential for cost savings.   In the 
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Netherlands, inter-municipal cooperation typically leads to delivery by a public firm and this 
helps promote competition as public firms bid for contracts outside their own jurisdiction 
(something not possible in Spain) (Bel et al., 2010).  
 
Spain has some promising approaches with its mancomunidades and comarcas that are able 
to engage both public and private service delivery at a larger scale (Fernandez, 2007).  Italy 
has seen the emergence of multi-utilities which combine across services to enjoy economies 
of scope and multi-government firms (in the same service) to gain scale (Bognetti and 
Robotti, 2007).  In the Netherlands, multi-government public firms are common in refuse 
collection and help promote competition with private providers (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007; 
2008). Australia has created a set of regional councils which are given the technical capacity 
to coordinate across local governments (Holzer and Fry, 2011).  Councils of Government in 
the US reflect a similar effort at cooperation (Korsching et al, 1992).  These cooperative 
approaches allow a small and fragmented local government system to gain the scale 
necessary to either provide the services publicly or to contract out with private providers and 
thus gain efficiency and service coordination goals.  However, the ability to address the 
redistribution and equity challenges is less clear as cooperation involves voluntary strategies 
and governments may be less likely to cooperate with higher need, lower income neighbors 
(Warner, 2006b; Hefetz et al., 2012). 
 
Strategies which combine services or government units to gain scale are most important in 
helping rural, small governments compete in the market for public goods.  However, even in 
these circumstances competition is still quite limited.  The examples below focus on 
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splitting the market, the service or the management to increase competition. These strategies 
require a scale and capacity that the smallest, rural local governments do not have.  Thus 
these strategies are more effective in addressing the challenges at the other end of the 
spectrum when government may be too large.  These splitting strategies can be used for 
smaller rural governments only if some form of cooperation – to gain scale and promote 
inter-governmental coordination - precedes the splitting of the market, service or 
management. 
 
Splitting Markets to Create Competition 
For many local government services, economies of scale are exhausted at 20,000 to 25,000 
population (Holzer and Fry, 2001).  Thus larger municipalities may benefit from splitting 
their service markets.  In the US this is especially common in garbage collection where a 
city will split its market into districts and contract out some while keeping others public.  
Such mixed market delivery helps ensure continued competition even after contracts are let 
and prevents the substitution of a private monopoly for a public one (Warner and Hefetz, 
2008).  It also enables the public sector to benchmark costs by staying in the business of 
providing waste collection services.  Miranda and Lerner (1994) attribute the lower costs in 
mixed delivery systems in the US to this ability to benchmark.  A final advantage is fail safe 
control. In the event of contract failure, the public sector retains capacity (equipment, crew 
and sector knowledge) to provide the service.  Mixed market delivery is less common in 
Europe (Bel and Fageda, 2010) – although Barcelona has employed this technique in both 
waste collection (Bel and Warner, 2009) and transit services (Albalate, et al., 2012).  One 
key benefit of splitting the market is the ability to maintain competition in the market after 
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contracts are let.  Otherwise competition will erode and subsequent calls will find few 
bidders as the losers left the market and a private monopoly has now been substituted for a 
public one.  For small communities, however, these mixed market strategies are uncommon.  
Their markets are not large enough to split, and this helps explain the lower levels of 
competition in small and rural communities. 
 
Splitting the Service  
Another approach is to split the service into its component parts and contract out those 
elements that are more commonly found in the market (back office processes, printing, 
dispatch), and keep those elements that have high citizen contact public.  This is commonly 
found in police services where the dispatch and criminal investigation functions are often 
contracted to an inter-governmental level and direct road patrols are kept local.  Another 
common example of splitting the service is in transit where different elements of the service 
are provided by different parties.  Public commuter transit is run by a public agency, para-
transit for the elderly and disabled may be run by a private entity or a non-profit (involving 
volunteer drivers), and van pools for rural outlying areas are run by small private firms (or 
by cooperatives of riders).  All elements of the system are coordinated regarding routes, and 
there may be joint sharing of garage and maintenance facilities (Warner and Hefetz, 2008).  
Key to the effectiveness of these mixed delivery systems is joint coordination to manage 
congestion and ensure public objectives (no cream skimming) are met (Barter, 2008). It is 
possible for small communities to participate in these mixed service schemes if they are 
organized as an inter-governmental collaborative, and for transit services, they often are 
(Warner and Hefetz, 2008; Albalate et al., 2012).   
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Mixing Public and Private Management at the Level of the Firm 
In general European local governments are more likely to mix management and finance 
between public and private sectors at the level of the firm, rather than mixing public and 
private delivery at the level of the market as in the US (Warner and Bel, 2008).  Public firms 
and mixed public-private firms enable government to retain economies of scale (without 
splitting the market) and to retain public sector control (on the Board of Directors) but 
permit private management and private sector labor relations which promote flexibility.   
These mixed firms evolved in part from the old State Owned Enterprise sector. But in recent 
years there have been efforts to instill more internal market discipline through private sector 
labor and management approaches in a process of corporatization.  Berlin used a mixed firm 
approach to upgrade technology in its urban bus transit sector and to encourage labor 
shedding and wage reductions after unification (Swarts, 2010).  Mixed firms are common in 
Spain in both water and waste collection (Warner and Bel, 2008).   
 
These hybrid firms are of two general types: public firms which have more flexibility in 
work force organization and purchasing than public bureaucracy, and mixed public-private 
firms where the government retains a control stake in the firm, but the firm operates under 
private commercial law. Public firms, or municipal corporations, are becoming more 
common in Portugal (Tavares and Camoes, 2007), Spain (Bel and Mur, 2009; Bel and 
Fageda, 2010), Italy (Bognotti and Robotti, 2007), the Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 
2007; 2008) and Norway (Sørenson, 2007).  By operating on an enterprise basis, they instill 
market logics inside the firm. In mixed public/private firms, the private partner may be a 
large firm with a solid position in the market and local government (or a collaborative of 
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local governments) engage in long term contracts with the private firm as a joint venture 
(Bel, 2006). Day to day operations are usually conducted by the industrial private partner, 
but government retains control over strategic decisions. These new forms of public 
enterprise are emerging to address the need to retain economies of scale by creating 
monopoly service providers that are flexible and market oriented but responsive to public 
control.  The central theme is the need for public planning and control even while market 
management and flexibility are pursued (Del Bo and Florio, 2011). Public firms can also be 
used to achieve economies of scale by contracting with several municipalities as in the 
Netherlands and Italy, or economies of scope where the multi-utility is a public firm which 
operates several utilities on an enterprise basis as found in Italy (Bognotti and Robotti, 2007) 
and New Zealand (McKinlay, 2011b).  
 
I will illustrate an example of the power of a public/private mixed firm by a child care social 
cooperative I visited in the city of Parma, Italy in 2010.  The local government wished to 
increase the supply of child care and wanted to attract both private finance and a private 
manager to achieve more flexible labor relations.  They created a new mixed firm, Parma 
Infancia, with control from the local government (which provides subsidies for child care 
and thus ensures effective consumer demand in the market) and finance from private banks 
to build new centers.  The Director is a banker, and management is by a social cooperative 
with national scale in elder and child care.  The mixed firm has succeeded in building 
several new centers, expanding a quality child care system to meet community demand, and 
has done so at costs 30% lower than what the local government could achieve alone.  Cost 
savings are attributed to greater flexibility in labor scheduling.   
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The advantage of these hybrid organizational approaches to service delivery is that the local 
government, as a partner in the enterprise, has more control over decisions regarding the 
service, and easier access to information on the service and on the firm.  This reduces the 
costs of monitoring – a key contract cost - thus reducing overall transaction costs. The goal 
of such mixed firms is  that managers “will give more weight to the objectives of local 
government and will give less weight to profit maximization.” (Warner and Bel, 2008: 5). In 
the US, by contrast, where more emphasis is given to creating competition in the market, 
managers have less time to spend on monitoring and accountability because they spend so 
much time creating and nurturing competition (Johnston and Girth, forthcoming).  
 
Mixed firms capture the benefits of economies of scale with monopoly provision, but they 
maintain public control and gain management and labor flexibility.  This creates a more 
stable form of privatization in Europe.  In the US, where managers focus their efforts on 
creating mixed markets with competition between public and private delivery, privatization 
is both lower and more unstable (Warner and Bel, 2008).  Reverse privatization is relatively 
unknown in Europe and not measured by any national surveys – except Spain which found 
almost none (Bel, 2006).  By contrast, reverse privatization ranges from 12 to 18 percent of 
service delivery in the US and is comparable to levels of new contracting out (Hefetz and 
Warner, 2004, 2007). However, smaller rural governments have lower levels of both mixed 
delivery and contracting back in.  Both of these market management approaches require 
capacity and scale sufficient to play in a market –something small municipalities lack.   
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Cost Savings and Privatization 
Differential rates of privatization are of special concern if there are cost savings with 
privatization. However, the data on privatization and cost savings does not show clear 
support for cost savings (Hirsch, 1995; Boyne, 1998; Hodge, 2000; Bel et al., 2010).  Water 
distribution and solid waste collection are the two municipal services with the largest 
experience with contracting out around the world, and a meta-regression analysis of 
published studies in these two services does not find support for cost savings under private 
production (Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010).  Water, as a natural monopoly, does not benefit 
from splitting the market.  Privatization merely results in the substitution of a private 
monopoly for a public one.  Strong regulation of water quality prevents cost savings due to 
quality reductions.  Europe in general has higher levels of privatization. In England and 
Wales water service has been privatized completely, in France about 52% of the service is 
private, in Spain about 45% of the service is private, in Germany, Belgium and Finland and 
Italy between 5 and 20 percent is private (Bel, 2006).  The remaining EU-15 countries have 
almost no privatization (Bel, 2006). France has a long history of private corporations 
providing water but recently there have been some important reversals such as the high 
profile re-municipalization of water in Paris where the city decided it can provide water via 
the public sector more efficiently.  Italy, in 2011, overturned a law requiring water 
privatization. Spain has higher levels of water privatization 42% than in the US 10% 
(Warner and Bel, 2008).  Consistent with the general findings on privatization and 
government size above, the highest levels of water privatization in Spain are among the 
municipalities in the 10,000 - 100,000 population range (Bel, 2006).   
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Solid waste collection has more potential for gains from privatization.  Economies of scale 
are exhausted at about 20,000 population (Stevens, 1978) and this creates potential for gains 
from privatization even by smaller municipalities.  The waste sector is also characterized by 
technological innovation (trash burn facilities, recycling, new approaches to landfills) and 
private firms typically capture innovations more quickly than the public sector.  For these 
reasons, privatization levels in solid waste are typically higher than in water.  In the US 
private delivery is found in 47% of municipalities.  In Spain it is over half, in Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway it is over 75%, and in Ireland, the UK, Netherlands and Italy 
privatization is around 40 percent (Bel, 2006).   In Spain privatization rates are lower for 
municipalities under 10,000 population. In the US privatization of solid waste follows the 
inverted U shaped pattern – lower for rural (39%), highest for suburbs (57%) and lower for 
metro core (29%) communities (author analysis of ICMA 2007 data).   
 
Markets alone, through liberalization and privatization, have not delivered lower prices or 
higher consumer satisfaction in network infrastructure services in the EU (gas, telecom, 
electricity, water, transit),  (Ceriani, Doronzo and Florio, M., 2009; Clifton and Díaz-
Fuentes, 2010).  Public service markets require management – to ensure quality, to maintain 
competition, and to ensure broader service coordination.  There needs to be a strong 
principal, ensuring coordination and that public objectives are met.  Barter (2008) has shown 
this critical public coordination role in transit, Clark and Bradshaw (2004) in electricity 
markets, Hipp and Warner (2008) in job training, and Warner and Gradus (2011) in child 
care.  The problem for small governments, is they lack the capacity to effectively manage 
markets.  Some form of coordination is needed to help small governments gain the scale 
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sufficient to secure market power to manage their public service markets.  This is where 
inter-municipal cooperation plays such a critical role both as an alternative delivery form 
when competition is low (Hefetz and Warner, 2011; Levin and Tadelis, 2010) and as a 
means to gain scale and market power for privatization to work (Bel et al., 2010; Bel and 
Mur, 2009; Bel and Fageda, 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored the question of suboptimal government size and the potential of 
inside strategies involving privatization and hybrid delivery approaches.  We have seen that 
privatization and hybrid delivery strategies are less common among the smallest rural 
governments.  What is required to effectively engage markets, is to be in a market that 
attracts competitive suppliers (most common among mid-sized governments and suburbs), 
or to have the management capacity to build competition, gain scale and manage mixed 
delivery strategies. Small, rural governments are at a disadvantage in each of these 
circumstances.  Solutions to the problem of suboptimal size require both inside and outside 
management strategies.  This analysis has shown the limits of inside management strategies 
that focus on privatization and hybrid approaches for the smallest rural governments.   
 
An outside management strategy is also needed. This can involve cooperation among local 
governments to gain scale and visibility to more effectively participate in the market, or it 
can involve a restructuring of governmental finance and service delivery competencies to 
better match the scale at which the service needs to be coordinated.  This outside approach 
requires some level of vertical coordination and hierarchical power.  Local governments, on 
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their own, will limit collaboration to those arenas in which it is clearly in their self interest.  
Challenges at the metropolitan regional scale require a regional view which is often lost in a 
fragmented local government system. Voluntary cooperation typically focuses on the 
services which are easier to address – making it harder to build political support for the 
services with more inequity across the metropolitan region (Frug, 2002).  
 
Problems with market approaches to address the challenge of sub-optimal government size 
occur at two ends of the spectrum. The smallest governments are least attractive and least 
able to play in market systems for public service delivery.  This denies many rural areas the 
opportunity to effectively explore the benefits of service delivery innovation.  At the 
metropolitan regional scale, the problem of suboptimal government size is the problem of 
fragmentation and the inability to coordinate and finance service delivery across the 
metropolitan region. This constrains regional economic development (Nelson and Foster, 
1999).  Solutions to each of these problems lie in collaboration – whether voluntary or 
forced – to encourage service and resource sharing and promote a regional coordinated 
view. 
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